From ‘Balanced Force’ to ‘Focused Force’

The new Defence Strategic Review (DSR) will place the Australian Defence Force (ADF) on a war footing and prepare it to defend the maritime approaches to Australia at range.

Published by the Australian Defence Department (DoD) on 24 April, the DSR can be seen as the final step in a decades-long process that has seen Australian defence strategy become more intertwined with US policy in the Indo-Pacific region. The US “will become even more important in the coming decades [and DoD should] pursue greater advanced scientific, technological and industrial cooperation [and] increased United States rotational force posture in Australia, including with submarines,” the review states.

Details of AUKUS Pillar 1 plans to deliver an SSN capability to Australia, released in March, can now be seen through the prism of what the DoD calls its ‘National Defence’ strategy, in which the acquisition of SSNs is its first priority. However, the closeness of this relationship means that any notions of Australian strategic or military independence can be largely jettisoned as the ADF adopts ‘National Defence,’ increasing to a critical level its reliance on the US for military equipment.

Analysing the strategic environment, the DSR acknowledges that the US “is no longer the unipolar leader of the Indo-Pacific [and the region has] seen the return of major power strategic competition”. In addition, Australia is no longer “protected by its geography [and the] limited ability of other nations in the region to project power”.

According to the DSR, the ADF’s current force structure “is not fit for purpose” for these strategic circumstances, and needs to defend itself properly. It states the ADF has a “balanced force” designed for joint operations to defend Australia and to engage in a wide range of low- and medium-level contingencies, but does not have effective defence capabilities to respond to higher level threats.

The review advocates a move towards a “focused force,” one better designed and integrated to protect Australia by fighting in a high-intensity conflict at distance within the wider region. This focused force will implement a “strategy of denial” that requires the development of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities. A2AD primarily needs long-range precision missile systems, and the DSR calls for accelerated procurement of the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) for its F-35A and F/A-18F fighters and the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) for the Army, along with a new land-based anti-ship missile system.

However, it also needs all-domain ISR and targeting capabilities, as well as amphibious forces, undersea warfare assets, integrated air and missile defence systems, and a theatre-level logistics capability to support everything.

The Army will get new landing ships to transport its forces into advanced defensive positions overseas, but will pay for some of the reforms with orders slashed for self-propelled artillery and IFVs.

But overall, with Australia better placed to defend itself and exert more power in its near seas, it will make it a more suitable base for US operations in the Indo-Pacific, should conflict between the major powers ensue.

Tim Fish in New Zealand for MON